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Editor’s note: The two essays in this issue’s Report on Health Reform
Implementation section emerged from a workshop, generously funded
by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, that was held in Chicago in
January 2014. The purpose of the workshop was threefold: first, to
increase communication and learning between state-level policy practi-
tioners and health policy researchers; second, to address key Affordable
Care Act implementation issues that states are currently grappling with;
and, third, in response to these issues, to identify useful policy instru-
ments and strategies for dissemination across the states. With these as the
goals, we asked several policy practitioners in different states to submit
questions on current implementation challenges that might benefit from
the insights of a policy researcher. We then identified researchers with
significant expertise in applicable areas to respond to a small selection of
these important questions. Charles Milligan’s question on how to address
churn to ensure continuity of care and Sara Rosenbaum’s response are
examples of the work that came out of this productive process. They rep-
resent the second of three sets of 2014 conference essays to be published in
this section. We welcome any feedback on the process or the issues.
—Colleen M. Grogan
Abstract Both before and after the Affordable Care Act (ACA), the US health
insurance system is characterized by fragmentation. Pre-ACA, this fragmentation
included major coverage gaps, causing significant periods of coverage interruption,
especially for lower-income people. The ACA does not end the problem of churning
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among sources of public financing, but it does hold the potential for enabling people to
move among sources of coverage rather than go without insurance. Several strategies
for reducing coverage churn exist, but none is foolproof and all are in their early stages.
Thus the ability of issuers to participate across multiple public financing arrangements
and to offer stable provider networks becomes crucial to achieving continuity of care.
Interviews with nine companies involved in developing or operating multimarket
strategies confirm the feasibility of this approach while revealing major challenges,
especially the challenge of finding providers willing to treat members regardless of the
source of coverage. Strategies for increasing multimarket plans and networks represent
one of the great areas of future policy and operational focus.
Keywords churn, Medicaid, multimarket plans
Introduction
As the Affordable Care Act (ACA) moved into its full implementation
phase, the initial open enrollment was all about the numbers. After recovery
from the near-death experience of Healthcare.gov, the question that eclipsed
all others became how many people would gain coverage. The launch
ended triumphantly; of an estimated 27.7 million people eligible for some
form of assistance (Buettgens, Kenney, and Recht 2014), 8 million enrolled
in marketplace plans (ASPE 2014) and 6 million enrolled in Medicaid
(CMS 2014).
But the ACA is about far more than isolated enrollment snapshots. The
nation is now in the initial stages of testing a deeper, underlying issue:
Is the ACA’s coverage stable and continuous? Numerous analyses have
identified income fluctuation as a key characteristic of the subsidy-eligible
population. One frequently cited study found that in a single year, about 50
percent of adults with incomes below twice the federal poverty level are
likely to experience at least one income change sufficient to cause a shift
between Medicaid and the marketplace, while 25 percent can be expected
to experience two or more changes (Sommers and Rosenbaum 2011: 232).
The problem affects all states, even those that have opted out of the
Medicaid expansion, although entrenched poverty that inhibits mobility,
along with highly restrictive Medicaid eligibility standards, lessens the
likelihood in opt-out states (Sommers et al. 2014: 703).
Continuity of coverage is associated with more accessible and higher-
quality health care, both of which are fundamental aims of the ACA. Thus
simply counting the number of people who are insured at any given
moment must give way to the more meaningful question of how many are
able to maintain coverage over time.
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In this regard, the ACA’s continuity problems simply are the latest
chapter in the story, since the overall structure of US health care financing
militates against coverage continuity in general. The nation is characterized
by multiple pathways to insurance coverage; until the point of Medicare
enrollment is reached, coverage stability remains an elusive goal for
millions. The problem with multiple coverage pathways of course is not
necessarily their multiplicity (although fractured financing poses problems
for other reasons); rather, it is that movement among the pathways is not
smooth and the paths are riddled with pockmarks. One important analysis
of the effects of this fracturing and gap-ridden system found that over one
three-year period, 38 percent of all nonelderly Americans were uninsured
at any point in time (Short, Graefe, and Schoen 2003: 4).
The ACA’s great advance is not that it replaces a fragmented insurance
market but that it offers the possibility, at least theoretically, for most
Americans to traverse multiple coverage pathways without periods during
which they lack any coverage at all. By closing the holes in Medicaid and
building an affordable and accessible individual private insurance market,
the ACA offers the potential to ensure that frequent transitions do not include
periods in which coverage is totally lost because of health status, life events,
or shifts in income. Thus, as the nation slowly settles into a new normal in
which being insured is not just a legal requirement but a social expecta-
tion, the challenge of coverage continuity can be expected to move to the
forefront. This challenge means devising solutions for those most at risk of
disruption.
Improving the level of integration between Medicaid and health insur-
ance marketplace enrollment systems would help. Indeed, an integrated
enrollment process—not just a unified application but a single, integrated
determination and redetermination system—lies at the heart of the Med-
icaid amendments as well as the design of the health insurance exchange.
States’ deep concerns over the workability of this model, coupled with
fears that they would lose control over Medicaid enrollment, led to its early
demise however, with implementing regulations that give states the choice
over whether or not to integrate. State autonomy to maintain Medicaid as an
isolated pathway has complicated matters; along with the rocky rollout of
the federal marketplace and many state marketplaces, the failure to inte-
grate has helped produce a backlog of millions of Medicaid applications
(Pear 2013). With time these serious problems likely will abate of course,
but, for now, integrated enrollment remains a pipe dream.
Another option for mitigating market churn might be twelve-month
continuous Medicaid eligibility, modeled on the idea of annual enrollment
periods in the individual and group markets. A continuous eligibility option
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already exists for children, and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS 2013a) has made continuous eligibility for adults a state
Medicaid option using its Section 1115 demonstration authority to enable
states to overcome normal month-to-month income reporting requirements.
Thus far, only New York State appears to have pursued this demonstration
option; legislation to require twelve-month continuous enrollment in
Medicaid has been introduced in the House and Senate during the 113th
Congress (H.R. 1698; S. 1980), but prospects for passage obviously are slim.
Another option would be to adopt a Basic Health Program. Added as a
coverage option under the ACA and modeled on a program launched in
Washington State in the 1990s, the Basic Health Program permits states
effectively to replace marketplace coverage for people with incomes between
133 percent and 200 percent of poverty with an alternative, publicly funded
insurance pathway administered in tandem with Medicaid. Research sug-
gests that by pushing the point of churn to twice the federal poverty level,
this approach might produce a modest impact on the problem (Hwang,
Rosenbaum, and Sommers 2012: 1318). But lengthy delays in the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services’ (HHS) implementation of the pro-
gram probably have doomed its chances, unless such a model is pursued
by states in 2017 as part of broader innovation models permitted under
the ACA.
A very different option, being pursued most prominently by Arkansas
under Section 1115 demonstration authority, is to simply eliminate a
separate Medicaid health plan market and enroll most or all Medicaid
poverty-linked Medicaid beneficiaries in marketplace plans. This approach
obviates the need to switch health plans whenever the source of insurance
subsidy changes (Rosenbaum and Sommers 2013: 8). Although Arkansas
holds promise, limits exist. First, CMS (2013b) has indicated that it will
approve only a few such models in advance of the 2017 innovation option,
until an evaluation is made. Second, Arkansas probably was politically
feasible at least in part because the state had no large-scale Medicaid
managed care industry. Without qualified health plans, the state literally
would have had to resort to traditional fee-for-service coverage or enroll-
ment of some two hundred thousand newly eligible adults into small pri-
mary care case management systems.
Even if premium assistance is expanded and states aggressively pursue
annual eligibility periods and integrated enrollment systems, nothing can
make churn go away. Evidence from Massachusetts, where near-total
coverage has been achieved, suggests that this number is misleading,
masking thousands who remain ineligible for any coverage, as well as
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thousands who at any given time are experiencing breaks in coverage.
Indeed, the state’s community health centers, bellwethers of the underlying
problem, report an average of 25 percent uninsured.
Inevitably, it is important to go beyond attempts to mitigate the effects
of churn from a coverage perspective and think about how to alleviate its
impact on the systemic side of the ledger. In this regard, a central strategy
might be for issuers to offer both Medicaid managed care plans and mar-
ketplace plans, operated in an integrated fashion, most notably, using a
shared provider network. Plans branded and positioned as continuity plans
appear to be a highly plausible strategy for offering continuous care to
their members regardless of the ‘‘back office’’ business of aligning subsidy
sources with public sponsors at any given time. At least conceptually, this
type of multimarket plan solution would have the power to shield people
from the financial dimensions of health care, so that plans and payers can
focus on the key issues of continuity and quality.
Could this approach work? In fact, the model seems to be taking off.
According to the Association of Community Health Plans, as of December
2013, four in ten issuers of marketplace plans also offered Medicaid
managed care plans (ACAP 2013). With a grant from the Commonwealth
Fund, the George Washington University Department of Health Policy set
out to study this phenomenon in order to glean early insights from plan
sponsors about their multimarket experiences.1
In reviewing the literature and consulting with industry representatives,
our research team concluded that we needed to capture the early experi-
ences of three distinct types of issuers: large Medicaid managed care
companies moving into the commercial market, community-based Med-
icaid managed care plans seeking to enter the commercial market, and
commercial insurers that have acquired a Medicaid subsidiary. In the end
we selected a total of nine companies, several of which have nationwide
markets and others of which are more localized to particular communities.
We sought to ensure at least one company in each of the three basic cate-
gories and were able to do so. In interviewing even the companies with a
national reach, we sought to focus on particular state markets, since
experiences from state to state might be different and we wanted to ground
the discussion as much as possible in the experiences in specific markets.
All of the companies we interviewed were highly experienced in one or
both markets (i.e., Medicaid and private insurance products). Interviews
were conducted during the winter of 2014.
1. The George Washington University research team consisted of myself and Nancy Lopez,
Mark Dorley, Carla Hurt, Jacqueline Miller, and Sara Rothenberg.
Rosenbaum - Report on Health Reform Implementation 237
Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law
Published by Duke University Press
Findings
The interviews yielded a number of notable findings. First, all respondents
reported that the problem of Medicaid/marketplace churn was a central
factor in their focus on developing a business model that can traverse
markets. Certainly, the opportunity to pursue covered lives in a new market
was a major consideration, but even more pronounced was their concern
over losing customers in whom they had made a major investment to
capture, simply because the source of subsidy changed. Previously, of
course, companies could do little about churn, since its most obvious
consequence was the total loss of financial sponsorship. Now, however, the
problem was one that could be addressed by devising an approach to
business operations that effectively followed their customers to a new form
of subsidy. Far from feeling that they could benefit financially from short
enrollment periods and constant movement in and out of plan membership,
companies saw continuity of coverage and care as a real plus from a
business perspective.
Second, companies that were moving from Medicaid into the market-
place (as discussed below, this direction appeared to be most pronounced
for reasons that became apparent as the interviews proceeded) had lower-
income marketplace customers as their primary focus. These companies
did not envision their great competitive edge to be in the middle- and upper-
income customer base (which in any event turned out to be a small segment
of the individual marketplace, dominated by lower-income, subsidized
customers). Instead, these companies focused on their traditional cus-
tomers—poorer individuals and families—who either had a real chance at
continued coverage or were acquiring it for the first time. From a business
perspective, a critical issue is that so many companies viewed the new
marketplace as an extension of the Medicaid market, since this business
orientation may propel many future decisions around how to structure and
operate the new market, from regulation of health plan products and
practices to decisions regarding when and how to update the ACA’s
essential health benefit coverage standards, which guide the individual and
small group markets generally.
This understanding of the new marketplace in terms of customer
demographics appears to be quite accurate, given who actually enrolled.
Depending on how health reform ultimately affects the employer-sponsored
health insurance market and even underlying employment patterns, as
well as the ultimate popularity of marketplace shopping, this initial
demographic profile might change. For now, however, these early business
assumptions regarding who would be in the marketplace have been borne
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out by the fact that the overwhelming majority of people who enrolled
in marketplace plans received tax subsidies; in the federal market alone,
which accounts for enrollment in thirty-six states, 87 percent of enrollees
are receiving subsidies (Burke, Misra, and Scheingold 2014).
Third, because the companies were targeting a heavily low-income
population, pricing their products became a major challenge. Premiums had
to be kept low, but so did deductibles and other forms of patient cost sharing.
Even with both premium assistance and cost-sharing reductions avail-
able to people with incomes below 250 percent of poverty, pricing posed
problems, since both the premium and cost-sharing reduction assistance is
pretty slim. Cost-sharing assistance begins at the poverty level, but by 150
percent of poverty, reductions begin to decline precipitously, from 94
percent actuarial-value-level help to 87 percent. By 200 percent of poverty,
help falls to a 73 percent actuarial value level. When companies tried to hold
down cost sharing, premiums inevitably rose, making them noncompeti-
tive. Lower-income people chose well, clustering in the silver market,
where cost-sharing reductions are available, but, inevitably, premium
pricing was key. Companies reported focusing cost-sharing reductions
on outpatient primary care and commonly used drugs, leaving those with
more serious health problems significantly more exposed to high costs, a
problem borne out by separate research (Brantley, Bray, and Pearson 2014).
Provider networks emerged as the most prominent challenge, a fact that
helps explain why the future of multimarket plans may lie in decisions by
Medicaid companies to move into the marketplace, rather than vice versa.
For plans with roots in Medicaid, moving into the marketplace largely
raised issues of capacity, not provider willingness. But even these com-
panies encountered difficulties when they attempted to grow additional
primary and specialty capacity. Physicians and hospitals expected com-
mercial rates, not the discounted rates that would enable companies to keep
premiums and cost sharing low. Commercial issuers with affiliated Med-
icaid business lines saw little prospect of convincing their commercial
networks to participate in plans whose membership would toggle between
Medicaid and the marketplace. Most respondents reported variable success
in negotiating provider discounts and devising alternative payment
approaches that could support a model that necessarily rests on limited
premium and cost-sharing assistance for a low-income population. The
inability to mount sufficient networks at deeply discounted rates, coupled
with surging Medicaid enrollment, caused several Medicaid-based com-
panies to delay a cross-market move.
A final and important finding was that companies did not view differ-
ences in the Medicaid and marketplace regulatory regimes as a deterrent to
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multimarket participation. Companies did not consider different coverage,
cost sharing, and plan performance measurement as insurmountable bar-
riers to being able to conduct business in multiple markets.
Discussion
Our interviews confirmed what the ACAP figures suggest: multimarket
plans are a viable approach. Whether such an approach enables members to
overcome breaks in care arising from constant subsidy switches remains to
be seen. Careful evaluation of plan performance and customer response
over time will be needed.
But to the extent that this approach appears to be a plausible means of
mitigating the deleterious effects of fractured financing, encouraging its
growth will depend on several factors: adopting continuous eligibility that
helps reduce the need to switch subsidy sources; using aggressive branding
strategies, coupled with consumer assistance and counseling, to enable
lower-income consumers to understand the continuity advantage and make
a continuity choice when selecting a plan; upward adjustment in Medicaid
managed care rates for plans that link to marketplace counterparts in order
to more equalize provider payments; and CMS guidance on approaches
that encourage multimarket plan growth through adoption of payment,
certification, regulatory, and outreach strategies that maximize the poten-
tial for this solution to spread.
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